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Abstract
Companies and academics have known for many years that reducing variation in
production processes can decrease production cost, increase product quality, and have
substantial impact on overall profitability. Tools to help companies track, assess, and
improve variation are numerous and readily available, but gradually an understanding has
emerged from implementing these tools that significant amounts of variation cannot be
removed from the factory, and the only way to continue to improve cost and quality
beyond diminishing returns is to move upstream in the process and design parts and
assemblies that are more variation resistant, or maintain quality functionality over a
broader range of variation. One methodology emerging to help companies with this task
is Variation Risk Management (VRM).
The problem with VRM and other methodologies is that they are often treated as side
processes that do not get well integrated into the overall product development process.
This results in training and improvement activities that optimize VRM on its own rather
than maximizing the effect VRM has on the product. In order to do this the initiative
failure cycle must be understood, and attention must be focused on information
management, management and organizational support, and process like communication
and integration.
Thesis Supervisor: Roy Welsch
Title: Professor of Statistics and Management Science
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel Whitney
Title: Sr. Research Scientist, CTPID and Sr. Lecturer, ESD
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Companies and academics have known for many years that reducing variation in
production processes can decrease production cost, increase product quality, and have
substantial impact on overall profitability. Tools to help companies track, assess, and
improve variation are numerous and readily available, but gradually an understanding has
emerged from implementing these tools that significant amounts of variation cannot be
removed from the factory, and the only way to continue to improve cost and quality
beyond diminishing returns is to move upstream in the process and design parts and
assemblies that are more variation resistant, or maintain quality functionality over a
broader range of variation. One methodology emerging to help companies with this task
is Variation Risk Management (VRM).
This thesis explores VRM, including an in depth analysis conducted at The Boeing
Company, and draws out themes, processes, and practices that can be universally applied
across industries and companies.
This chapter gives the context of the thesis work, including an introduction to The Boeing
Company and VRM terminology and tenets. Additionally, the problem, project, and
hypothesis are introduced.
1.1 Boeing Overview
Founded in 1916, Boeing has grown into a multinational corporation best known for
building large commercial jetliners. Its 166,800 employees are broken into five major
units: commercial airplanes, air traffic management, Connexion by Boeing (in flight
broadband), Boeing Capital, and Integrated Defense Systems. These units combined in
2003 for $50.5 billion in profit (Boeing 2003).
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The Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) division is currently embarking on the design
of a new 200-250 seat jetliner designated the 7E7 Dreamliner, scheduled for first delivery
in 2008. This aircraft is being designed as a light and fuel-efficient alternative to other
planes in this market, and will employ composite technologies to an extent never before
attempted on commercial jetliners. Major objectives for this aircraft relevant to this
thesis are:
" Approximately 80% reduction in final assembly time from current products
(Puget Sound Business Journal 2003)
" Large but undisclosed reduction in manufacturing cost
" Improved quality over existing products
VRM is one methodology by which BCA hopes to achieve these and other goals.
1.2 Variation Risk Management Overview and Definitions
Variation Risk Management is defined as the holistic view of variation concerned with
the proper allocation of limited resources to identify, assess, and mitigate variation in
order to improve quality and reduce cost as efficiently and effectively as possible
(Thornton 2003). For simplicity in understanding the breadth and limits of this
definition, it is important to understand that VRM can be seen as the unification of
Variation Management (VM), and Dimensional Management (DM).
Variation Management is typically done in the factory during production. It can be
defined as the systematic allocation, based on cost and risk, of limited resources to either
reduce variation or reduce the impact of variation (Thornton 2003). Rather than
attempting to replace such methodologies as Six Sigma or Statistical Process Control
(SPC), this part of VRM is more concerned with laying out a framework to target and
prioritize variation reduction efforts to gain the most benefit from company resources (i.e.
Six Sigma blackbelts).
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Dimensional Management can be viewed as designing products with the effects of
variation in mind. Thornton defines DM as the tools used to manage and design for the
variation in individual dimensions. These can include GD&T (Geometric Dimensioning
and Tolerancing), datum schemes, and measurement methods (2003). By understanding
the interface points and interactions between parts, "key characteristics" can be identified
that drive product quality and performance. By analyzing and understanding these key
characteristics (KCs), targeted efforts can be undertaken to reduce the variation, increase
the design's robustness - or resistance to variation - or redesign for improved qualities in
an efficient and data-driven manner.
VRM ties these two parts together in a continual loop. By identifying KCs during the
design phase, production can better target VM analysis and improvement efforts for
maximum effect. The data collected by production on capability and quality issues can
then be fed back to development to better identify and analyze KCs, and thus design for
the capabilities of production. The more cycles a company follows VRM processes
through, the more focused and less costly its VRM efforts can become.
Useful definitions for understanding VRM are as follows:
Table 1: Variation risk management definitions
Definitions
Key A feature of a system, assembly, part, or process, whose
Characteristic expected variation from nominal has an unacceptable
(KC) impact on cost, performance, or safety.
Dimensional The tools used to manage and design for the variation in
Management individual dimensions. These can include GD&T
(DM) (Geometric Dimensioning and Tolerancing), datum
schemes, and measurement methods.
Variation The systematic allocation, based on cost and risk, of
Management limited resources to either reduce variation or reduce the
(VM) impact of variation.
Variation Risk The holistic view of variation concerned with proper
Management allocation of limited resources to identify, assess, and
(VRM) mitigate variation in order to improve quality and reduce
cost as efficiently and effectively as possible.
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VRM will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter 2.2, but these initial definitions
were deemed helpful as a brief introduction to the problem statement.
1.3 Problem Statement and Hypothesis
The Airplane and Services Integration Team (ASIT) has responsibility for developing
and managing a VRM plan for the 7E7 Dreamliner development. They have their own
ideas on how to accomplish this task, based on their collective experience with past
airplane programs. The team has decided, however, that an independent review and
validation of processes and tools should be conducted before committing to a potentially
flawed course of action.
The problem is that Boeing has identified variation management and proper allocation of
tolerances as critical to the 7E7 program success, but needs actionable enablers for the
success of these activities given the timeline and resource constraints of the program and
the company.
The Boeing-specific hypothesis is that VRM activities and personnel are constrained by
more than VRM-specific tools and processes, and the most effective methods for
enabling VRM success will require action from upper management rather than the ASIT
team themselves. A more globally applicable hypothesis is that processes and tools
enable VRM success, but information, organization, and management structure are the
main factors determining the degree of success a VRM program will experience.
1.4 Project Description
This project served as an independent review of the 7E7 Dreamliner Variation Risk
Management plan. Daily work was conducted as a member of both the ASIT team and
the Final Assembly and Delivery (FAD) team, whose primary responsibility was
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determining how pieces of the aircraft would be delivered to Boeing, assembled, tested,
and made ready for delivery to the customer.
Access to previous VRM practitioners and existing commercial product final assembly
areas was available, as was access to current VRM tools and process documentation.
The project had a duration of six months, at the end of which recommendations were
made along with supporting evidence from variation analysis projects conducted using
principles discovered during the project.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
The layout of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the history of Variation Risk Management within Boeing as well as
discussing themes in literature and academia both directly and indirectly pertaining to
VRM.
Chapter 3 focuses on the methods employed to attack the problem and validate the
hypothesis.
Chapter 4 describes the cargo floor case study. After a situational overview, the process
steps and tools will be described, along with the method of communicating the results.
Additionally, the success of the project will be discussed from an effectiveness
standpoint.
Chapter 5 puts a brief framework around the next three chapters.
Chapter 6 describes how Requirements, Key Characteristics, and Process Capability are
critical to developing cost effective parts that assemble with robust quality.
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Chapter 7 discusses the appropriate metrics, proper assignment of accountability through
those metrics, and appropriate team structure for VRM. The cycle of initiatives, or the
tendency for initiatives to replace initiatives - only to get replaced by yet another
initiative, is also discussed.
Chapter 8 discusses the tendency to sub-optimize small pieces such as data collection,
VRM, and engineering rather than optimizing the entire processes of product
development, and focuses on three of the biggest returns on investment: improving the
data collection process, the communication process, and the integration process.
Chapter 9 aims not to summarize the information contained in this thesis, but to
synthesize the various case studies, lessons, and ideas to present a final look at VRM
from a development process perspective. The hypothesis will be discussed to determine
if there was enough to data to support it, and some final thoughts on how to best improve
an organization's VRM program will be considered.
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Chapter 2: Background and History
This chapter introduces the history of Variation Risk Management within Boeing as well
as discussing themes in literature and academia both directly and indirectly pertaining to
VRM. Additionally it contains a brief discussion on how these themes pertain to the
previously stated hypothesis.
2.1 VRM History within Boeing
Boeing has conducted variation risk management initiatives for more than two decades.
During this time, concepts that currently fall under the moniker of VRM have gone by
several different names. Often the same concept or process was "reborn" under a new
name either to shed the assumptions and controversy associated with the old name, or
because the tools themselves changed names or brands.
Adding to the complexity is the fact that the initiatives were introduced to different
geographies at different times, and on occasion, under different names. For simplicity,
this section will briefly focus on a single thread of this history for Commercial Aircraft in
Puget Sound. Many related initiatives, such as quality circles, are left out.
People recall the identification of Key Characteristics back into the '70s. At the time the
term was confined to using statistical processes to look at deviation and its effects, but the
idea of focusing in on specific dimensions with the greatest effect on quality began to
spread. While this idea grew, the next significant step in the evolution appears to be in
the late '80s, when D1-9000 came into existence.
The D1 -9000 document was initially a list of requirements levied on BCA suppliers,
centered on identifying and measuring KCs. The document was owned by procurement
and quality assurance, and served as a reference to vendor managers who wanted to
discover the maturity of their vendors' design practices. D1-9000 focused on variation
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management through statistical process control (SPC) more than dimensional
management, but clearly had aspects of both.
As the document grew and matured, multiple internal groups began qualifying
themselves to the standard. With the increased use the need for more structure became
apparent. The D1 -9000 contained sections entitled AQS (Advanced Quality System),
and as these sections expanded in use and breadth, a full blown initiative termed AQS
was launched.
AQS still maintained the document numbered D1 -9000 as its reference document, but
began to put some focus on dimensional management as well as variation management.
At this point it is useful to talk about content at a high level. Designed as a document to
validate or help control production, AQS focuses on laying out requirements, listing ways
to validate requirements are being met, and presenting flowchart processes and their
associated tools for validation or troubleshooting. Even the most updated version of the
document does not go much beyond laying out a framework manufacturers are expected
to follow or conduct business within (Boeing Company, 1996a).
At some point a small group of AQS experts who felt AQS was not focusing on the
proper tools or processes created the Hardware Variability Control (HVC) program.
HVC and AQS maintained separate but overlapping domains, related loosely through
their common use of key characteristics. With the weight of the 777 strategic initiative,
HVC gained traction quickly. A steering committee was set up to help manage the effort,
and training began in earnest to teach people about the processes and tools of HVC.
Eventually AQS and HVC were joined in November 1996 via the D1-9011 linkage
document. This document merged the HVC and AQS processes with the understanding
HVC was contributing the majority of DM activities and AQS the majority of VM
activities under a continuous "Plan-Do-Check-Act" process (Boeing Company, 1996b).
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After learning from the 777 development program, HVC focus shifted slightly for the 737
Next Generation program but still maintained its structure. Soon after the 737NG
program ended, however, HVC lost speed, focus, and some credibility with production
personnel, and the initiative eventually ceased to be. Many hypotheses exist as to the
reason for the program's end, but the most likely were the high costs of the HVC
committees and activities, the lack of clear representation of cost savings HVC brought
about, and the factories' disillusionment with the measurement programs HVC created.
One steering committee member said, "We turned off the community of SPC with HVC,
so we needed a new name to get going with this again." Six-sigma was gaining in
popularity for VM tasks, and so many HVC alumni refocused on six-sigma, using many
tools already familiar to HVC. The six-sigma group in BCA has been recently
dismantled.
DM tasks and tools have stayed with the company under different names. While in
actuality they are distinct processes and technologies, Determinate Assembly (DA) and
Advanced Technology Assembly (ATA) are often used as interchangeable terms for
Dimensional Management.
The current situation BCA finds itself in seems to be a fragmented one, where some
people focus on variation management and some focus on portions of dimensional
management. There is a great deal of focus on DM and VM tools, but very few people
focus on the processes of DM or VM, and fewer on the overarching process to effectively
combine the two processes to maximize the benefit.
Other details of the current situation must be understood and appreciated before a path for
the future can be discussed. Important topics are attitudes toward initiatives, key
characteristics, taking production measurements, and career advancement.
2.1.1 Initiatives
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VRM practitioners in BCA have lived through name changes, tool changes, focus
changes, and leadership changes within the last few years. This refers only to VRM
initiatives, and does not take into account any other changing corporate initiatives these
VRM practitioners have undertaken. Each of these initiatives or changes was likely the
right thing to do at the time, but the more things change, the more the people will stay the
same, either ignoring or paying mere lip service to the current directive. This situation is
called the "flavor of the month problem" in other companies. In order to get buy in for
new VRM tasks and processes, this situation must be understood and accounted for.
2.1.2 Key Characteristics
KCs have been a part of Boeing for nearly 30 years. Over that span the answer to the
question "what is a key characteristic" has changed multiple times. This gives rise to two
very real problems. The first is that people who have had bad experiences with KCs will
be resistant to anything termed "KC" in the future, even if it is a genuinely new and/or
useful concept. The second problem is that people who know an old definition for KC
may intentionally or unintentionally ignore a new definition for the term, and in turn
cause confusion on future projects.
Industry, in the mean time, has mostly standardized on the term "key characteristic."
Boeing must now decide between using industry standard terminology, which may
require a full-scale reeducation effort, and using non-industry standard terminology,
which may confuse partners or suppliers who use the industry standard terms. Both
efforts are similar, but it will be more difficult to determine the effectiveness of the
reeducation effort since simple use of correct terminology will not be an indication of
proper knowledge.
2.1.3 Production Measurements
Every interview conducted within Boeing spent significant time discussing measurements
in the factory on key and non-key dimensions. Engineering, operations, and quality all
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accepted the fact that 777, and to a lesser degree 737 NG, required unnecessary
measurements to be taken during production. These measurements required significant
time, effort, and money to take and record, and the benefit was never shown or
adequately explained to those tasked with taking the measurements. In 1997 the lack of
explanation for expensive measurements came to a boil with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, among others. Animosity and mistrust still exists within
Boeing and within the supply base from this experience, and any plan that involves the
taking of extra measurements will need to deal with this sentiment.
2.1.4 Career Advancement
Interviews shed light on the fact that VRM was initially seen as a path to career
advancement for many people. Because it was a relatively new specialization there were
very few experts in the company, and the potential for rapid advancement enticed many
to specialize in VRM tools or processes. As a counterpoint, more than one person
encountered within the company did not readily admit they were very experienced with
HVC because they felt association with that initiative was now a career hindrance. In
order to make future VRM programs successful people must feel confident the skills they
learn will be appreciated and rewarded. Without that incentive to learn, VRM will likely
be a "flavor of the month."
2.2 VRM Research and Uses
The history leading up to today's thinking in VRM and variation analysis is too broad to
effectively discuss, so this chapter will better define the distinct aspects of VRM as well
discuss some advanced research in these areas. The framework used for discussion will
be Thornton's three phases of VRM: Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation, shown
in Figure 1, adapted from the same text (2003). Not all aspects of this methodology will
be discussed or defined, and those seeking better definition than contained in this thesis
should be directed to said text.
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Zo Define the scope of the VRM application
Identify critical system requirements
LL
Identify system KCs
z
Create variation flowdown
H' Assess frequency and contribution of defectsz
LU
Assess cost of defectsCO)
C,)
Assess risks and prioritizeCO
Document
Z Identify mitigation strategies
j- Select mitigation strategies
Select project portfolio
Execute mitigation strategies
Figure 1: VRM Methodology
2.2.1 Identification
While defining the scope of any project is critical, for this discussion the identification
phase will begin with requirements and end with a variation flowdown, which defines the
key characteristics and their interactions via part features and processes to define
"variation chains" that contribute to the performance of the product relative to the
requirements.
Variation risk management begins with the identification and subsequent ranking of
requirements, whether corporate, regulatory, or customer. VRM does not necessitate any
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particular methodology for this task, and many practitioners use methodologies such as
Quality Function Deployment, which focuses on taking the "voice of the customer" and
determining and ranking product requirements (Mazur 1996). Countless other
methodologies exist for this function, and can be researched easily.
Initial KC identification and the subsequent flowdown creation can be either "top-down"
or "bottom-up." In bottom-up analysis, individual parts are assessed and critical
dimensions for performance determined. The engineer puts the analyzed piece parts
either physically or virtually into their assembly and determines the next level of critical
dimensions in order to meet the top-level requirements. Top down analysis starts with
the critical product requirements and determines which aspects of the assembly or
assemblies are most critical to meeting that requirement. When that is determined, the
part or sub-assembly is analyzed to determine what aspect is most critical in meeting the
higher-level performance requirements.
These two methods of flowdown creation are not mutually exclusive, and usually
companies will practice both to a certain degree, though it may heavily favor one method
over the other. Reasons to favor bottom-up include a desire to reuse existing parts for
time and cost savings as well as its relative ease when compared with the top-down
process. The top-down process, however, is generally assumed to have favorable results
for the product, though its time and monetary costs must be considered as well (Whitney
2004).
The speed of the particular development cycle will drive the number of times the
developers cycle through the identify, assess, mitigate loop, so it is important to note now
that an initial variation flowdown on a new product may have little or no supporting data
at this point, whereas an update to an existing product may have a great deal of data
associated with the flowdown structure on the first cycle.
2.2.2 Assessment
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Any way a company chooses to create the flowdown, it has three main methods of
assessment: educated guesses, measurements either on test pieces or similar production
pieces, or simulation (Craig 1995). Within these three categories there has been a great
deal of research on methods to aid in analysis. A brief overview of the tools, or model
types, available is listed in table 2 below (Thornton 2003).
Table 2: Model types, inputs, and limitations
Firevious
designs
-errormance
of previous
design
Frevious
designs
basea on
engineering
judgment
Qualitative Performance Engineering Not based on Fair Low
of previous judgment numbers
design
Extreme Performance Process Gives the worst Fair Med
value model capability case, but simple
analysis to analyze
Tolerance Tolerance Engineering Dependent on Fair Low
validation model tolerances correct allocation
of tolerances and
availability of
Process accurate process
capability capability data
Root-sum- Sensitivity Process Can be time Good Med-High
squared model capability consuming to
build sensitivity
model
Monte Carlo Performance Process Time consuming Excellent High
model capability to run the model
Geometry- Assembly Process Useful only for Excellent High
based model capability geometry'
variation
simulation
software
Statistical Statistical Previous Shows only Excellent High
correlation model designs correlations, not
causality
Prototype Prototypes N/A Only as good as Good- High
prototype excellent
'This statement is difficult to understand, since all the models listed are truly only useful on geometries of
parts and assemblies. However, it is likely Thornton means that it is only useful for the actual geometries
of the parts in the CAD system, and abstractions or partial-geometry investigations may not be possible
without the additional task of creating entirely new analysis-specific geometries.
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Research in the medium to high complexity models has been extensive. Even the
relatively straightforward root-sum-squared (RSS) method has papers discussing the
theories (Scholz 1994) and effectiveness in case studies (Altschul and Scholz 1994).
While relatively easy to comprehend and learn, RSS capability in analyzing linear
geometries is far reaching.
Monte Carlo analysis goes a step beyond RSS and provides a statistical analysis of final
build tolerances under a wide range of different designs and component tolerances that
were defined by the analysis (Excell 2003). Monte Carlo analysis is often used by
geometry-based variation simulation software to analyze variation, and is often
completely embedded in the CAD system, which allows existing CAD users a quicker
learning curve due to their familiarity with the user interface (Schmidt 2000).
Despite the success of commercially available methods, much research is done on
advanced methods of analysis. There is no shortage of work investigating new
applications for analysis (Soderber and Lindkvist 2002) or new approaches (Srikanth et al
2001). Most agree that the purpose of tolerance design in product components is to
produce a product with the least manufacturing cost possible, while meeting all
functional requirements of the product (Lin and Chang 2002), but each promotes their
method as the one that will save more money.
No research was found which analyzed what types of problems or situations were best
analyzed by which method, and few comments were uncovered in research
documentation discussing when not to use the suggested analysis. Each article merely
dove into the technical merits of the analysis and presented the facts to support the
method's validity.
2.2.3 Mitigation
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Determining the proper mitigation strategy is crucial to a cost-effective VRM exercise.
The "correct" strategy depends a great deal on where in the development cycle the
product is, what a company's production system is capable of, and business strategy.
Generally, a company can mitigate based on design changes, process changes, process
improvements, monitoring, or inspection (Thornton 2003). Each of these options is a
field of study unto themselves, but design changes and process changes will be discussed
briefly.
Generally it is easier to mitigate via design changes early in the product development
process. Once a product is in production, it may be costly or difficult to phase-in new
parts or assembly methods. If the cost is not prohibitive, creating new designs is an
option, via whatever methods the engineering department is comfortable with. Tooling
can be redesigned to deliver the product quality desired, or lastly a company may chose
to mitigate risk by validating or qualifying the product on an existing production line.
Mitigation based on changes to the production can also be costly and difficult, depending
on the situation the company is in. If a new production line is being built for the product,
changing the processes to achieve higher quality and tighter tolerances can be looked at
as an incremental fee above the baseline process, and may be easier to justify the cost.
Swapping processes on an existing line can have far reaching impact and cost that may
uncover roadblocks such as space constraints, lack of experienced workers on the new
process, or union issues.
2.3 History's Role in the Hypothesis
Documentation and research into VRM tools is plentiful. Sources for VRM processes are
less abundant, but enough exists to give any company a viable roadmap. Why then, is it
so difficult to find a company with a thriving VRM practice?
Boeing has used variation risk management processes and tools for well over a decade in
all areas of BCA, yet finds itself in the position of starting the VRM effort on the 7E7
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with only a handful of practiced experts. Despite having some of the most cutting edge
tools for tolerance analysis and a mandate to use them, the magnitude of VRM influence
on the designs is minimal (This is especially dangerous due to the unforgiving nature of
composites when compared to traditional aluminum).
If access to the latest processes and tools, plus a core of people knowledgeable in how to
maximize the effect of them is not enough to predict the effectiveness of a VRM effort,
what else is required? Only one article (Thornton et al 2000) could be found that
addressed companies' desires to reduce variation while discussing their struggle in
executing on these strategies.
This realization, along with interviews, case studies, and analysis led to the hypothesis
that processes and tools enable VRM success, but information, organization, and
management structure are the main factors determining the degree of success a VRM
program will experience.
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Chapter 3: Thesis Methodology
This chapter focuses on the methods employed to generate actionable enablers for VRM
success at Boeing and validate the hypothesis that information, organization, and
management structure are the main factors in determining the degree of success a VRM
program will experience. The overall process involved creating a whitepaper, validating
the findings included in the whitepaper on an actual variation issue facing the team (a
"case study"), and then closing the loops by updating the whitepaper with the findings
and communicating all pertinent information throughout affected teams within BCA.
Chapters 4 through 8 explain in full the work described in this section.
3.1 Create a Whitepaper
The 7E7 team felt the best medium for the independent review and the most rapidly
deployable to all effected groups would be a whitepaper. As defined by
hyperdictionary.com, a whitepaper is a document whose purpose is to educate. The
whitepaper was chosen to both heighten awareness that the author had no political
incentive for writing the document, and to focus reader's attentions on the issues to be
considered more than the possible solutions presented. Agreement amongst all interested
parties would be ideal, but initiating a dialogue about VRM and VRM issues was the
minimum definition of a successful paper.
Based on the past experiences and present situation of VRM at Boeing, it was a goal of
this whitepaper to draw out and present best practices applicable given the current state of
knowledge throughout BCA. This current view would then be compared to the 7E7
VRM plan to determine any beneficial changes that need to be made.
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The general process for this white paper was to ask similar questions to as many people
with VRM experience as possible, and then extract from that data a list of common
knowledge, best practices, and unique solutions.
The analysis process began with a list of questions created by the author (Appendix 2).
The questions were generated from researching Variation Risk Management books,
periodicals, and Boeing documentation. The questions were structured to achieve several
objectives. The key objectives are listed in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Interview Objectives
Objectives Ga i t
Determine the extent of the Determine the current state of VRM
individual's knowledge knowledge within Boeing
Discover tools, documentation, and Determine Boeing's process
processes available during projects capability and ability to make
necessary tools available to
everyone.
In conjunction with above goal,
determine Boeing's training
effectiveness.
Extract opinions and data to Build a list of perceived best and
support opinions on effectiveness worst practices
of processes and tools
Examine management practices Determine Boeing's ability to manage,
during projects track, and quantify VRM processes
An effort was made to make data collected comparable from interview to interview.
However, if rich information was found in a particular area of expertise, that information
was pursued. Therefore each interviewee may not have been asked each question
directly.
After all interviews were completed, some interviewees were contacted again to fill in
information holes or validate writings and assumptions.
The interviewees were initially selected from a short list of current dimensional
management experts. Each interviewee was asked to provide names of additional
experts, people with limited experience, and people who had a poor experience with the
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topic. The list of interviewees expanded in this manner until three weeks before the
whitepaper completion date. Fifteen interviewees were deemed internal VRM "experts,"
four interviewees had limited experience with VRM training or factory measurements,
and the other interviewees either had average experience levels with VRM or deep
expertise with some aspect of VRM, such as statistics or tolerance modeling. Though to
some respect all the interviewees had one or many "poor experiences" with VRM, only
one interviewee knew of an individual who vocally despised all aspects of VRM, and
unfortunately that person failed to respond to multiple requests for meetings or
information.
The whitepaper and the results of the interviews are the basis of Chapters 5 though 7, and
specific answers or themes are referred to in these sections.
3.2 Validate Via "Case Study" Analysis
Variation analysis was conducted on the cargo floor for the new airplane during and after
the creation of the whitepaper. It was the intent to develop best practices, discover useful
tools and processes, and then apply these to the analysis to validate or evaluate their
performance.
This analysis was then presented to all affected teams to stand as its own body of work,
as well as to test the effectiveness of variation analysis in driving business and
engineering decisions within the company. Two case studies were ultimately conducted
and presented.
The initial cargo floor case study is presented fully in Chapter 4.
3.3 Close the Loops
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This section discusses how the information loops around the whitepaper and case studies,
and around the organization and VRM plan, were closed to leave no loose ends.
During the wrap-up phase of the first case study, information and teachings from the case
studies were related back into the whitepaper. The whitepaper was then released through
the VRM community and to every member of the 7E7 management team. Information
from both the whitepaper and the case studies was then discussed in one-on-one sessions
with managers to heighten awareness and answer questions.
Those with further questions were directed to the ASIT team and their VRM plan in order
to close the information loop and allow the process to continue in its intent, without the
need for the author to remain in the process.
The final case study did not conclude until after the whitepaper was distributed
throughout the organization, and was not discussed at length outside the ASIT and FAD
teams. It will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis.
3.4 Determine if Problem is "Solved"
This thesis will discuss metrics and milestones The Boeing Company can use to
determine if VRM has been a success on the 7E7, but metrics for determining the success
of this thesis or the validity of the hypothesis are difficult at best.
Data on the success of the ideas put forth in this document is not available at this time,
and realistically could not be obtained until at least the conclusion of the 7E7
development, thereby making validation a subjective measure. The subjective measures
used for the purposes of "validation" are:
* Are ASIT members convinced that focusing attention and/or improvement
activities on identified processes will contribute to improved VRM performance
versus previous VRM efforts
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" Is awareness throughout the management structure heightened with respect to
VRM issues, and is management convinced identified processes and improvement
efforts are valid and will contribute to improved product performance versus
previous product development efforts
" Are the conclusions valid across other types of analysis, work efforts, or business
needs
* Were the topics, improvement suggestions, and conclusions in accordance with
experience and results from one or both of the case studies
The degree to which the work comprising this thesis "solved" Boeing's issues will be
discussed in depth in Chapter 9.
3.5 Summary
This chapter discussed the methods employed to attack the problem and validate the
hypothesis. Despite the issues involved with a scientific validation of the material
presented, the findings and the examples brought forth through the case studies will show
clear actions and considerations useful during a VRM implementation.
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Chapter 4: "Case Study" - 7E7 Cargo Floor
This chapter describes the cargo floor case study. After a situational overview, the
process steps and tools will be described, along with the method of communicating the
results. Additionally, the success of the project will be discussed from an effectiveness
standpoint.
4.1 Problem Statement
The new 7E7 aircraft has a requirement to be faster and less expensive to manufacture.
The cargo area was identified as a subsystem that could have significant time and cost
improvement from proper understanding of key characteristics and allocation of
tolerances.
The cargo area of most commercial jets is actually broken into two separate areas, the
forward and aft, which are located below the passenger deck, or main deck. In a
widebody aircraft such as the 7E7, the cargo areas are electromechanical systems
designed to move cargo containers or cargo pallets from the cargo door into position,
lock the cargo into place for safe flight, and then transport the cargo back to the door for
removal.
Passenaer Deck
Figure 2: Common layout of main deck and lower cargo areas
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The major parts of the cargo area are the roller trays, which hold and transport the cargo,
and power drive units (PDUs) which provide the power to propel the cargo along the
roller trays, and the pallet locks, which are located in the roller trays and flip up to
constrain the motion of cargo during flight. The side and center guides channel the cargo
into the proper location during load and unload, and also serve to constrain the cargo's
motion during flight.
Figure 3: Sample widebody cargo area
Additionally, investigation into a new order of assembly was needed to validate the
ability to install the aft cargo system in two separate parts of the fuselage and then join
the fuselage with the cargo system already inside.
4.2 Identification
With the scope and intent of the project defined, the process of requirement
identification, key characteristics identification, and flowdown creation began.
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Requirements had been gathered by the cargo systems group in preparation for the
analysis. Requirements were assembled from Boeing internal documents, engineering
experience, and industry guidelines such as NAS 3610, a document created by the
Aerospace Industry Association that outlines flight safety requirements for cargo (1990).
Requirements were grouped into tiers, with Tier 1 being the most general grouping and
Tier 3 being the individual requirements. Reasons for the requirement were also listed to
help explain intent on the less obvious requirements. A single example of a requirement
is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Example cargo analysis requirement
Restrain Base Restraints Distance between side guides, Constrain container/pallet
Cargo (NAS3610) center guides, and rollout stops side to side (horizontally)
The 47 requirements identified for this study were then reorganized into 64 part or part-
to-part requirements that could be measured and analyzed. With the help of the cargo
engineers and some data from the 777 program, a list of 21 potential key characteristics
was created. An example of three potential KCs is shown in Table 5, which are labeled
as measurements.
Table 5: Example part-to-part measurements for analysis
Distance to Constrain container/pallet Length - LSideGuide + CenterGuide
Center side guide side to side (horizontally) Length - RSideGuide - CenterGuide
guides Distance to Constrain container/pallet Length - CenterGuide + RollOutStop
rollout stop side to side (horizontally)
A simple flowdown was then created to define the interaction of the key characteristics.
Once this definition was completed the team agreed to proceed forward with an analysis
based on the flowdown. The flowdown, KCs, and list of measurements were then used to
build an analytical model of the cargo system.
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4.3 Assessment
In order to assess the probability of defects and each KC's contribution to defects, two
tools were used to model the cargo area: Microsoft Excel and Dassault 3DCS. After
building and populating the models with the proper information, each KC was ranked in
importance and the results documented.
The two tools were chosen for their availability within the company as well as their
unique strengths and weaknesses. Excel is familiar to nearly all engineers and no special
training is needed in order to create sophisticated models. It is, however, easy for even
experts to make minor mistakes that could drastically affect the validity of the model.
3DCS is a program that uses solid models created in Catia to assess the effects of
tolerances on variation. An expert can create accurate models relatively quickly even
with a great deal of complexity, but beginning users can equally easily create models that
appear to model the environment properly, but are in fact highly inaccurate.
4.3.1 The Excel Model
The Excel model was created using both worst case scenario and root sum squared
methods. Both methods were chosen to allow a richer understanding of the results and
the robustness of the tolerance scheme.
Using the geometries of the relevant parts in the cargo area a coordinate system was
created to define the nominal locations of parts, holes, bolts, and other important features
of the cargo system. The cargo system is laid out from two datum points, and these
points were entered, and the tolerance chain laid out throughout all the features in three
dimensions. All tolerances, lengths, and other variables were entered into a column
where they could be viewed and edited with minimal effort.
Again wherever it was available tolerance and capability data was taken from the 777
program and used in the creation of the model. Where tolerances had already been set on
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the 7E7, those numbers were used, and where no data was available, experts were
consulted and asked to provide a best guess. It should be noted as the program advances
and capability information becomes more specific, the model can be updated very easily
to reflect the better information, and will in turn produce better, more accurate results.
In order to make the results understandable to those unfamiliar with the inner workings of
the model the results were displayed in the approximate layout of the cargo area with
green or red highlighting to relay acceptable or not acceptable variations based on the
tolerances. The display format of the model is shown with a hypothetical data set in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Excel model with sample data
Cost data was not made available during this study, so probability and severity of defects
were used to assess risk and prioritize. The results of the study were documented and
presented to the affected groups.
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While all the results cannot be published, one dimension had the clearest effect on system
performance and quality. The pallet locks, and more specifically the distance from pallet
lock-face to pallet lock-face was the single most critical dimension in the cargo area.
Lock-Face to
Lock-Face
Distance i
Pallet Pallet Ple
Side View of a Roller Tray with Pallet Locks
Figure 5: View of roller tray and lock-face to lock-face distance
The underlying tolerance chain (Figure 6) provided many options for improving the
robustness of the cargo area. Additionally, variations to dimensions that were not in this
tolerance chain were generally found to have little or no effect on system performance,
and provided many options for reducing system cost by reducing tolerance requirements.
Lock-Face to
Lock-Face
Distance
Roller Trays
Frames Joint
Fuselage Skins
KC PATH
Figure 6 Path over which tolerances must be held to deliver the Lock-Face to Lock-Face Distance KC
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4.3.2 The Catia 3DCS Model
The Catia 3DCS model was intended to be a simplified version of the actual cargo
system; however, it was also intended to analyze the effects of variation on cargo in
motion along the cargo floor. This added complexity proved to be too great for Catia's
capability, and ultimately the model was abandoned.
Despite the inability to fully define the cargo system, enough information was collected
from a subset of measurements to lend some credibility to the accuracy of the Excel
model. Additionally, the attempt to push the capability boundaries of Catia 3DCS and
the Catia DMU Kinematics package provided usable data on where functionality is
limited, and what steps can be taken to improve analysis capabilities.
4.4 Mitigation
Multiple mitigation strategies were analyzed based on the models. Changes to the
tolerance scheme, part redesigns, tooling redesigns, and assembly process changes were
all investigated.
Internal experts both from engineering and the production floor were involved in creating
the mitigation strategies. Additionally, Delta Airlines cargo handlers were contacted to
get users' perspectives on positive and negative aspects of current cargo systems. This
information, combined with watching them use the Boeing 767 cargo system at Sea-Tac
airport, was used in the generation of additional strategies.
4.5 Communication
Members of the cargo systems group, ASIT team, and several people responsible for
variation risk management from other teams were invited to a meeting to discuss the
results of the analysis and the mitigation strategies with the most promise. The
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presentation walked through the steps taken, results at each point, and outlined the need
to move forward on one or many of the mitigation strategies.
One of the steps in the presentation showed how previous analysis efforts had been
flawed, causing many engineers to rely on faulty data. Because the previous analysis was
done by the cargo systems group, and because they presumably did not like hearing they
had made mistakes, several people in attendance tuned out the remainder of the
presentation or attempted to discredit the validity of the analysis and findings.
Although this behavior hindered the communication of the mitigation strategy, and
unintentionally biased those responsible for deciding which mitigation strategy to pursue,
at least one proposed strategy has been incorporated into the system design.
Interestingly, the mitigation strategy chosen was not a direct product of the variation
analysis, but rather by common sense. Each cargo area has eight rows of rails running
the length of the area which support and transport the cargo. Pallets lay across all eight
rails, while cargo containers rest on four rails each. The number of rails is not
structurally driven, but simply must hold and transfer the weight of the cargo to the
airframe while allowing for proper translation and restraint of the cargo.
Each rail attaches to the airframe roughly every two feet with four screws. The holes
must be drilled into the frame using tooling, then the rails are attached with the screws.
That makes for eight times the drilling operations, part numbers, material handling, and
attachments of a single rail. Six rails (of slightly increased size) could achieve all the
functionality of eight rails with no effect on performance. In short, by removing two rails
and redistributing the remaining rails across the width of the plane, a major part of the
cargo system becomes 1/4 less expensive, lighter (roughly), and 1/4 faster to install than
the current design.
4.6 Project Results
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This case study produced five mitigation strategies, detailed tolerance information for
many subsystems of the cargo area, and the critical system requirements for an in-depth
study of the body join that the cargo system would have to account for. The result to the
7E7 was that a single mitigation strategy was adopted while the others, along with the
tolerance information, were widely ignored. The body join analysis proceeded and
produced a great deal of information.
Some people might be temped to look at the net result of the cargo floor analysis and
declare it a failure. While information was generated that will never be used, the return
on investment for the analysis is astronomically high.
Several people have pointed to the fact that the one mitigation strategy accepted did not
come from the mathematical analysis, but rather from common sense, as a reason why the
VRM activity was not needed. It should be noted, however, that the need to think
through all aspects of the cargo system and the time spent on VRM activities are what
sparked the realization, and without the effort it is unlikely the mitigation strategy would
have been presented or executed.
Finally, the level of detail needed to complete the cargo system analysis exposed a lack of
understanding around the details of the body join. That realization launched a body join
VRM analysis that went on to provide a richer understanding of the joints and aided in
further decision making. Without the cargo analysis, the need for the body join analysis
would not have been discovered until much later in the development process, at which
point any analysis might have had limited time to effect much change in the decision
making process.
While there were failures in the process, the VRM activities provided a better than
average ROI, and made the end product better and less expensive to manufacture.
4.7 Conclusion
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Rather than focus on the failures or successes, or degrees thereof, it was the intent to
draw meaning from what happened, and derive actionable recommendations from this. It
is the assertion of this thesis that improvements to VRM-specific tools will generate
lower than expected returns until improvements are made in information management,
management and organizational support of VRM, and process improvements for both
VRM tasks and the use of VRM data.
With reasonable personnel expense and minimal technology expense, even one accepted
mitigation strategy made the project a financial success. However, contrary to normal
logic, more money or effort put into VRM would have generated little or no additional
gain. In fact, the VRM activity already generated more useful information than was
utilized, and that information remains valid and usable.
Processes that improve the results of VRM activities may have generated information or
mitigation strategies that were not generated and would have been accepted by the 7E7
program. But since information was generated that wasn't used, it is argued here that a
more efficient use of effort or funds would be to improve the manner information is
stored, used, and distributed, along with better use and definition around initiatives,
metrics, and accountability.
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Chapter 5: Lessons Overview
The following three chapters will detail lessons in information management, management
and organizational support, and processes. This chapter puts a framework around the
next lessons in the next three chapters.
The lessons presented in the next chapters integrate the interviews conducted at Boeing,
the whitepaper findings, the cargo floor case study, and the body join VRM activities. It
is the intent of these chapters to provide examples from Boeing and present lessons that
can be applied at any company. Additionally, several readers of the whitepaper noticed
the majority of the VRM lessons applied almost directly to other initiatives they had been
a part of. It is the hope that readers of this thesis will also be able to extract the lessons
from VRM and generalize them for use in other initiatives or aspects of business.
5.1 The Model
The product development process is a compilation of many sub-processes, each using and
generating data that influences the final product. In order to maximize the benefit of the
overall chain, each link must be as strong as the others. It is important to note that the
data collection, VRM, and engineering processes can be impeccably strong, but if the
communication processes, data management, and management support are not in place
and effectively applied, the overall impact these processes have on the product will be
greatly limited. A visual representation of this process can be seen in Figure 6, and will
be explained in the following two subsections.
It is cost savings and quality improvement of the product that VRM is responsible for,
and ultimately judged by. The best information, analysis, and mitigation strategies will
not affect the product if the overall product development process isn't prepared for the
information or responsible for incorporating it in the product. Because of the need to take
the holistic view of the product development process, lessons in how to properly organize
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these key aspects of the overall process will be investigated in the following three
chapters.
Data Collection
Processes
Data >Communication
Processes
Data Processes
Data Communication
Processes e
Data Engineering
/Processes
Data ')Product
Figure 7: Interplay of information, management, and processes
5.1.1 The Processes
The square boxes in the process diagram represent the major processes in the product
development cycle, from a VRM perspective. It is the intent, however, for this model to
remain valid if the "VRM Processes" step is removed and replaced with any other type of
analysis or engineering support process.
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The first process is data collection. This can be any method of collection, ranging from
an internet search to a real-time Statistical Process Control feed, but for the general VRM
case it should be looked at as the methods by which process capability data is collected.
The second and fourth steps are communication processes. This is to highlight two facts
in particular, the first being information gathered and not communicated is wasted
information, and the second being ineffective communication can impede the transfer of
knowledge, reduce the amount of information used or comprehended, and alter the
message of the data to the point where it is misunderstood or misused. Any of these
outcomes diminish the ability of the following process to properly contribute to the
design of the process.
Communication processes such as phone calls, emails, and conversations may be difficult
to manage, but the methods by which people access databases, present information in
meetings or presentations, or construct a case for a contentious information can greatly
effect the understanding or use of the data, and can be managed.
VRM processes have been and will be further discussed in the paper, and engineering
processes are too company-specific to try to address here, but both of these processes are
part of the overall design processes and their ability to respond and contribute to each
other is important.
5.1.2 The Interactions
Management support, data, and feedback are shown as the three types of arrows in Figure
6. The data must find its way into the processes in some way or another. It can be an
automatic entry into a database or a chart in a powerpoint presentation, but there must be
some mechanism that takes the data in its raw form and gets it into a form that can be
communicated. It is important to note that the data going into a communication process
is not necessarily the same data coming out of that process. This situation can be
mitigated in several ways, such as determining the proper format for data entry or data
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communication, but it should not be assumed that data is not open to misinterpretation or
mistakes. It is also a key part of this model that data is generated, modified,
communicated, modified, and so on until finally a product is created. It is the opinion of
this paper that product development is data driven in some form, even if the data is
merely an engineer's gut feeling or proclivity.
Management support acts on each process in order to drive actions and results. It is the
variation in amount of management support and pressure on each individual process that
can create imbalances and optimize a piece at the cost of the whole. Not to say that each
process requires the same amount of support, but "the right amount" of support
depending on the company, the people, and any number of other factors. It was
determined that management supports the product by supporting the processes, and not
by "supporting" the inanimate product, so there is no management support arrow for the
product.
Feedback is an important part of any process. One failing of this diagram is that it
became too complex to show that engineering processes can provide feedback to data
collection without going through VRM, but the general point should remain clear. Each
process must react to the positive, negative, important, and even unimportant feedback
from the other processes, however, once again, the communication processes used for
feedback can have a large affect on the way the feedback gets interpreted and therefore
acted upon by the other groups. Lastly, while the product should "feed back" into the
other processes, it was determined a non-living object wouldn't actively provide feedback
to the processes and organizations, so for simplicity sake no feedback path is shown here.
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Chapter 6: Lessons in Information Management
Managing critical information is something Boeing knows how to do, but it can be
observed Boeing does not always realize what constitutes critical information.
Requirements, Key Characteristics, and Process Capability are critical to developing cost
effective parts that assemble with robust quality.
Proper identification, organization, and communication of requirements affect every
aspect of the design process. Without good requirements, engineering will not be able to
identify and subsequently meet customer needs. Failure to achieve customer satisfaction
will result in potential customers choosing competing products.
Key characteristics can only be identified properly through analysis and understanding of
requirements. Without proper identification of KCs, engineering will not be able to
understand and eliminate the significant effects of variation on parts and assemblies, and
manufacturing cost will increase dramatically.
Failure to track and understand process capability, or process performance, allows
excessive variation to continue in production without a plan or means to reduce it.
Identification of and management of key characteristics will limit costly measurements to
only critical areas while reducing the cost of quality and ensuring quality improves
dramatically. Failure to track critical dimensions opens the door for quality defects.
Incorrect or non-existent process capability information makes proper identification of
key characteristics more difficult, which leads back to increased measurement and
production costs and decreased quality. This loop shows the interrelation of these three
types of information, and underscores the criticality of properly managing the
information.
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For a graphical representation of how R&Os, KCs, and Process Capability Data (PCD)
relate to each other, as well as how they affect production costs and quality, see Figure 7.
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Figure 8: Relational diagram of R&Os, KCs, and Process Capability Data
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6.1 Requirements
6.1.1 Requirements Definition Process
Each interviewee was asked one or more questions intended to determine how
requirements were defined and handed off to a product team. Three answers were the
most common: the DR&0 2 (Design Requirements & Objectives) document, Aero
Department communications, and previous aircraft.
Some of the interviewees mentioned the requirements came from customers, but didn't
know the process used to translate customer requirements into engineering requirements.
It was clear very few engineers have direct contact with customers. Lack of customer
interaction forces engineers to, on their own, interpret and determine intent of unclear or
insufficient requirements. This potential disconnect often leads to unmet customer
requirements. Clear and concise requirements are critical to proper design and the
avoidance of unmet customer needs.
The reliance on requirements from past projects was evident and to some degree
disconcerting. More than half of the interviews spent some time talking about
requirements carried over from past programs that were not understood, could not be
explained, but could not be removed.
Interviews indicated an AIP (Airplane Integration Plan) worked well for housing VRM-
related requirements. This document has no authority, however, and was only used as a
communication tool within the teams. It holds limited information, and is a duplicate of
more detailed information housed and owned at other locations.
2 An Example Entry from a requirements & objectives (R&O) document is included below for reference:
Major end items delivered to Final Assembly should utilize simple joining and
holding/transport fixtures that are provisioned for multiple models. [BO-BRO138]
Assumptions/Rationale Major component assembly, traditionally using large stationary tools, will
be accomplished using modern assembly methods and simple,
movable, and multi-function (assembly/transport) fixtures. Reduces
non-recurring and recurring costs.
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7E7 Requirements Locations
A requirements database (DOORS) holds all Tier 0, Tier 1, and Tier 2 requirements and
objectives for the 7E7 program. Regulations, requirements, objectives, and design
philosophies are entered into the database, potentially through such documents as the
DR&O, BR&O (Build Requirements & Objectives), and MR&O (Marketing
Requirements & Objectives). These are then held and parsed into the AR&O (Airplane
Requirements & Objectives) for Tier 0 requirements, and team-specific SR&O (System
Requirements & Objectives) for Tier 1 and lower requirements.
After the creation of the AR&O and SR&O database reports, the other R&O documents
maintain authority, but maintenance and update tasks are confined to the Airplane and
System R&O documents, as it is now the system of record.
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Marketing TRANSLATE FILTER 7E7 R&O Website
Business
Engineering 7Production System
nngirerid and Product Design
Technology Requirements
Production
People
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All requirements and objectives contain attributes that detail the compliance owner,
affected owners, and assumptions and rationale. These attributes are intended to provide,
but do not always provide, the information necessary for an engineer to determine the
reasoning behind a requirement or objective, and identify the group to approach for any
further inquiries.
The Product Definition is a collection of documents that detail the design of the aircraft,
its bill of materials, and its build plan. This system of documents resides outside the
DOORS database, and is the authority for all developed aspects of the completed airplane
definition. Developed aspects may include specific requirements levied by the team on
the design, such as material requirements or tensile strength of a part.
6.1.2 Requirements vs. Objectives
One problem several interviews uncovered was the inconsistency in correctly
categorizing requirements and objectives. Boeing's DOORS system defines a
requirement as "a feature or condition that must be satisfied to achieve program and
product goals." DOORS defines objectives as "features or improvements deemed
important to the degree that they add positive net value; often these are 'stretch' goals
that become requirements given adequate cost/benefit information. Often, goals that are
only objectives are listed as requirements for the program."
Here is an example of the problem. A requirement might state excrescence drag4 needs
to be lower than some number. An objective is added as a means to achieve the
requirement, stating no gap should exceed 30-thousandths of an inch. However, the 30-
thousandths objective becomes a requirement, and gaps that contribute little or no drag
are held to the new requirement despite added production cost. Making the objective a
requirement forces an engineer into a potentially sub-optimal solution that might be more
3 The "system of record" is the document or data location that is the authority. Information in the system of
record is by default correct, and discrepancies or disagreements between systems will be settled in favor of
the system of record.
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costly and less effective then making some 25-thousandths and some 35-thousandths
gaps.
The lesson pulled from the interviews is twofold. First, a requirement is something that
will hold product release until it has been met, and anything short of that is an objective.
Second, if engineers understand the purpose and reasoning behind a goal it will likely be
solved in the most effective way, but if an objective becomes a sub-optimal mandate, the
metrics and incentives in place drive an engineer to follow the letter of the requirement
with little thought on improvement. Worse, a requirement that lacks reasoning and
definition carries with it a high likelihood of becoming one of the many poorly
understood "requirements" that get passed from program to program, driving the wrong
behavior and costing untold sums every time.
6.1.3 What to learn
Requirements and objectives are critical to meeting the needs of customers, regulations,
and the corporation. They must be managed in a manner that makes them clear,
consistent, and readily available in order to speed and support the decision making
process. Steps taken to manage objectives, the system of record, and the methods of
communication will aid in the making timely, effective decisions.
Manage Objectives
Almost everyone agrees that objectives are often inaccurately communicated as
requirements. Requirements are rarely, if ever, incorrectly communicated as objectives.
Some feel this situation arises because objectives are often times ignored or set aside in
an effort to meet all the requirements by a deadline. This may be true, but it is
unacceptable to "upgrade" an objective to a requirement just to get attention drawn to it.
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4 Excrescence drag is drag due to such excrescences as grooves, ridges and steps, rivets, and cylinders and
stub wings inmersed in the boundary layer (as defined by Engineering Sciences Data Unit).
Objectives should justify their importance by including actual cost or opportunity cost
data. It is often difficult to quantify either of these costs, but it is inefficient to ignore this
important analysis and elect instead just to make the objective a requirement so that it
gets more attention. This action takes focus off true requirements, and still does not help
engineers or organizations determine the relative cost of missing or importance of
meeting objectives.
Identifying requirements and objectives is not a science, and perfection may not be
attainable, but the following simple rules will help in the identification process.
" If failure to meet the requirement will not delay or cancel the project, it is an
objective
" If the requirement is not defensible with data or customer information, it is an
objective until such time as the data exists
" If the requirement specifies a solution (i.e. a gap must be 30-thousandths at a
specific joint) is either an objective or a derived requirement, and should be
labeled as such
Manage the System of Record
Many companies have multiple locations for data, or change the location of the system of
record as a program or the data progresses. In most cases Boeing has reduced to one
stable system of record, but in some instances there are still multiple or undefined
systems of record. Replication often times introduces errors or omissions in one or the
other locations, and can lead to confusion over which of the locations is the system of
record. Having two systems of record for the same data is dangerous for integrity and
ownership reasons, and should be avoided if at all possible. In order to maintain integrity
or data and ensure the proper data is used at the proper time, there should be only one
system of record, or one system for a particular data type, and it should remain
unchanged for the duration of the project.
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Additionally, all members should readily know the systems of record for various data
types. If they do not, this should be cause for concern moving forward, and reeducation
on proper requirements referencing may be needed to ensure all teams are working from
the same set of requirements.
Manage the Method of Communication
Groups or organizations that create their own documentation for requirements need to be
stopped. Team-specific documents may serve a temporary communication purpose, but
documentation that becomes a team's system of record tends to get updated infrequently
and introduces an unnecessary failure mode for the requirements process. If the systems
of record do not report necessary data in a format acceptable to the overall team, effort
should be spent improving the system of record rather than on dangerous and inefficient
workarounds.
6.2 Key Characteristics
6.2.1 Past
The proper identification of Key Characteristics is critical to VRM processes.
Understanding the significance of a KC is critical to properly identifying and
communicating a KC. Boeing has, by most people's recollection, done this poorly. The
silver lining is that now people have very good ideas on what KCs should be.
The term Key Characteristic has been around Boeing for roughly 30 years by some
people's memory, and in that time its definition and focus has changed frequently. It has
had several definitions and focuses, and no one seems to agree on what the definition was
at any particular point in time.
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Two interviewees related a story of a KC seminar at MIT several Boeing employees
attended. At the end of the multi-day event, Boeing still had no consensus on what a KC
was.
During the 777 program, KCs were everywhere. One story aided in explaining the
situation. A high-level manager heard a pitch extolling the virtues of KCs but warning
never to have more than five on a part. The manager somehow mistook or
miscommunicated the lesson and a requirement was implemented that each part have at
least five KCs. This story was met with nods of agreement or fascination by all of the
subsequent 777 engineers I spoke with, but it was not disputed.
Production was responsible for measuring the KCs, and after incurring the cost without
tangible benefit for as long as they could stand, revolted and eliminated most
measurements altogether.
The story on the 737 Next Generation is similar. Having learned from the 777
experience, the design team implemented fewer KCs, but still ran into eventual resistance
from production as the effort and cost of tracking the large number of measurements
continued. Those interviewees appearing the most knowledgeable about both the 777
and 737 NG projects raised concern that the average engineer didn't fully understand
what a KC is. This lack of education caused KCs to be incorrectly identified and led to
many of the problems seen in production.
Two interviewees expressed a desire to hold engineering accountable for KCs indicated
on drawings. One interviewee recalled a Ford engineer claiming they had to provide
reasoning for any KC as well as the budget to account for it in the factory. This
particular method of holding engineering accountable for its Key Characteristics may
have only been mentioned by two, but several more felt there was a general lack of
accountability among engineering for correctly identifying KCs.
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6.2.2 Present
Focus and intent may have changed significantly in the past, but different Boeing
locations appear to be converging. Roughly a third of the interviewees directly said a key
characteristic should only exist when variation susceptibility can't be designed out.
Nearly all remaining interviewees made claims that past programs overused KCs, and the
Boeing community now understands KCs should be used sparingly.
It should be noted at this point that KCs generally fall into five categories (Thornton,
2003): product KCs, system KCs, assembly KCs, part KCs, and process KCs. An
example of a product KC would be excrescence drag, where variation potentially has a
large negative effect, but no amount of design creativity will be able to eliminate the KC,
and measurement of the KC in production is impractical. All the KCs are important, but
most references to KCs in the whitepaper are to part or assembly KCs, such as a critical
dimension or stiffness, and this section in particular focus on these types of KCs.
The cost of labeling a KC was a factor in most of the people's minds. Labeling a KC on
a drawing brings about actions in the design process along with measurements and
inspection in the manufacturing process. This activity cost, while difficult to pinpoint in
its entirety, gets multiplied by every single KC identified throughout the airplane.
One interviewee asks people to look at KCs from a manufacturer's perspective. If all
dimensions have tolerances applied to them, but a few are labeled as KCs, how are the
production personnel supposed to react to the KC essentially telling them "try harder on
this dimension?" The point being the typical reaction is no reaction.
A small number of people felt KCs needed to be identified, but not necessarily measured
in production. A slightly larger number felt a KC that doesn't need to be measured is
likely not a real key characteristic.
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6.2.3 What to learn
It is important to understand the company's reasons for identifying KCs in order to
develop a plan for managing them. Two reasons are prevalent: to aid in designing robust
products that reduce negative effects of variation and to identify variation-sensitive
dimensions5 and communicate that to production. The reasons are not mutually
exclusive, and it is an assertion of this thesis that both these aims should be adopted and
communicated.
If the reason is to identify variation-sensitive dimensions and communicate that to
production, production needs to understand the consequences - in terms of cost,
performance, or quality - of varying from nominal on each individual KC.
If the reason is to aid in designing robust products that reduce negative effects of
variation, engineering needs to focus significant up-front effort in the identification of
and subsequent redesign for the removal of KCs through the design process.
While both reasons involve KCs that must be managed, the supporting information that
must be managed is different, and the audiences for the information are different. In
order to effectively distribute and communicate the information to both engineering and
production, multiple interfaces or displays may be necessary to access the KC
information, though it should remain a single source rather than multiple sources.
Additionally, the question of when to measure a KC must be addressed. It is suggested
that measurements and/or satisfactory Cpk are necessary because of the "risk" component
of a KC. The development of a "measurement plan" to assess KC risk in an ongoing
manner during production should be undertaken, and the plan enacted to determine if
measurements should be taken or not. Because a KC is "high risk" this month does not
5 Variation-sensitive dimensions are dimensions that require tolerance limits that are close to the
manufacturing process capability. While any tight-tolerance dimension can be considered variation
sensitive, it only becomes critical when the manufacturing process is barely capable or incapable of
meeting the requirement.
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mean it will be next month, and a KC that wasn't deemed "high risk" during product
launch may become high risk due to any number of changes in process, personnel, or
material.
If KCs are used in development and production, once the identification, analysis, and
redesign steps are completed the KCs must be communicated to suppliers or
manufacturers in a manner that draws attention AND affects behavior. Loss functions or
cost curves can go a long way in this endeavor, but compiling this information can be
difficult if not impossible for all KCs. Designs that eliminate all but a necessary few KCs
based on actual process capabilities will have more luck drawing proper attention to these
dimensions. However, without measurement plans, process improvement plans, and
requirements more stringent than tolerance goalposts, KCs will remain tolerance bands
indistinguishable from all other dimensions, but with a special note to "try harder here."
6.3 Process Capability
Suppliers and internal manufacturing have been asked for process capability data over the
course of many projects and years. No interviewee, nor current ASIT team member, was
aware of a current location holding that information or process for acquiring that
information.
Process capability databases have existed within the company, but the level of benefit
provided was not agreed upon by the interviewees. It is believed Boeing as a company
did not see the benefits of process capability databases outweighing the support costs,
since none of the interviewees knew of any current process capability databases.
Information is available at certain manufacturing locations for certain manufacturing
processes, but these information repositories are not well known.
Those familiar with getting process capability information from suppliers agreed that it is
not an easy process. Past development projects have used a Request for Process
Capability Data (RPCD) document with some success. Those most familiar with the
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RPCD described its use as a lengthy iterative process requiring an early start, adding the
process must be performed on the majority of piece parts. Complicating its use is the fact
that many parts are not assigned to a specific vendor until very late in the process.
Because of this those in need of the data must either query many vendors for process
information, even though only one data set will be used, or wait until potentially too far
into the process before contacting the actual supplier for data.
Additionally, one interviewee warned that current suppliers are often hesitant to provide
process capability data on current Boeing parts because they are worried the data may be
used for contractual negotiation in addition to or instead of being used for design work.
6.3.1 What to learn
The constant collection of manufacturing data is critical to providing engineering with an
understanding of the point at which their designs become risky or prohibitively
expensive. The processes measured and frequency of measurement can be changed or set
in a manner to limit costs while still providing benefit.
Short of continual monitoring, the best way to get process information in a manner that
benefits the engineers and ultimately the product is to get suppliers, internal and external,
involved in the design process early. Bringing shop-floor experts into design meetings is
an accepted practice at most companies for almost all major assemblies, and the benefits
of that practice extend to sub-assemblies and detail parts. The RPCD is a valuable tool
that can be used when co-design is not possible, but having those intimately familiar with
process capability during the design process is the best second option to having hard
capability data.
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Chapter 7: Lessons in Management & Organizational Support
The appropriate metrics, proper assignment of accountability through those metrics, and
appropriate team structure are key enablers for VRM. Breaking the cycle of initiatives,
or the tendency for initiatives to replace initiatives - only to get replaced by yet another
initiative, is also of utmost importance for VRM. This chapter focuses on these items and
their role in shaping the outcome of VRM efforts.
Success or failure of VRM will largely depend on the depth of penetration and the
amount of focus it receives from the program. Penetration is achieved either from top
management down or from the grassroots up. The 7E7 program does not have the luxury
of time necessary for a grassroots effort, so it must get the right kind of management
support. Focus is achieved by management support, but setting up the team and
organization in a manner conducive to the work required is critical as well.
If sufficient penetration is not achieved, much of the program will continue without
gaining any benefit from VRM. If the whole program does not benefit from VRM, it is
unlikely the small victories achieved will be enough to convince Boeing of the benefit of
VRM. If sufficient focus is not achieved, schedule will dictate behavior and the design
will fall back on the known methods for designing an aircraft, many of which are not
applicable to the 7E7. VRM will again fail to bring about significant benefit, and will
likely follow the path of AQS, HVC, and other initiatives that did not stand the test of
time.
Providing the conditions for success is critical to achieving success. Based on interviews,
five topics emerged as significant contributors to the failure of past initiatives: metrics,
team structure, accountability, training, and the idea of the corporate initiative.
In an effort to help demonstrate the interrelation of these topics, the following flow
diagram was created (Figure 9). It shows how initiatives get started and eventually fail
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based on metrics and accountability, giving birth to new initiatives. There are other
failure modes and other influences, but in an effort to keep it relatively simple this
diagram only investigates this portion of the loop.
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7.1 Initiatives
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In order for VRM to achieve significant benefit on the 7E7 program, its purpose, process,
and tools must be adopted by the teams. In the past, adoption has been driven via
initiatives, such as AQS and HVC.
Those past initiatives, however, have generated two camps around the issue of how to
present VRM to the 7E7 team. Roughly half of the interviewees felt in order for VRM to
be accepted, an initiative must be declared and a support structure erected to help drive
the practice into the team. The others felt VRM should be driven into the team via the
current management structure without calling it an initiative.
This dichotomy arises based on perceptions of past VRM initiatives' success, or lack
thereof. Attempting to paraphrase, some feel the eventual termination of those initiatives
and the lack of current focus equates to failure, and another initiative with a new acronym
will suffer the same fate. The others feel focus cannot be attained and change cannot be
achieved without the kind of attention initiatives provide.
Adding complexity to the argument is the fact that VRM will not be the only initiative
VRM supporters have to worry about.
The 777 program had nearly a dozen initiatives associated with it, each one adding to the
workload of those responsible for their execution. The 737 NG had nine. Each of these
initiatives were deemed critical to the success of the project, yet by most people's
recollection no additional time was allotted for the completion of the initiatives'
associated tasks.
Recollection of the initiatives varied between interviewees with experience on these two
projects, but none recalled what all the initiatives were, and barely more remembered
ever knowing, though most remembered with disdain how many there were.
Unfortunately interviewees were not asked to give a post-mortem on the success of the
other initiatives to determine their relative success or discover their fate.
66
7.1.1 Analysis of Initiatives
Initiatives create focus but have a real and unfortunate side-effect of creating a distinction
between "my real job" and "the initiative." Unless an initiative can clearly demonstrate a
reduction in workload, or management actively shifts work or resources to accommodate
the initiative, it will be viewed by most as additional work. Additional work, no matter
how beneficial and well intentioned, is not something many employees get excited about.
Even if all team members are open to some new tasks or processes, we must consider
what will happen if they are given nine initiatives with nine new tasks and processes. A
day is 24 hours; a work day is some degree shorter. Nine initiatives plus what someone
considers their "real" job don't fit. Once a person is forced to decide which initiatives
seem important and which don't - without management prioritizing for them - it is a very
short path to a decision that all initiatives are equally unimportant. Even if people do not
make that last logical step, it is a reality that something among this group of tasks is not
going to get done. VRM cannot afford to enter the initiative lottery in the hopes the
majority of the team members choose its processes and tasks as most important.
7.1.2 Side Effect or Main Effect?
Much of the previous analysis has pointed to a conclusion that initiatives all end, and
usually end without achieving their stated aims. Despite a seemingly worldwide opinion
that "corporate officials" and "upper management" don't know what they are doing (i.e.
"Management must be crazy to..."), let's assume for a moment that they do. There must,
then, be a logical answer to why corporations continue to direct money and resources to
various initiatives that seem to fail.
A potential answer is that initiatives direct money and resources to awareness and
experimentation. Proper data was unfortunately not collected on this aspect, but several
people mentioned through the course of interviewing that despite HVC's apparent failure,
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many people who previously dismissed the need to deal with variation during the design
process now readily agree it is a problem that needs to be addressed.
Additionally, there are thousands of people scattered through the company now with
HVC experience. While the degree of their knowledge varies, they all understand the
effects of poor variation management and some methods to control variation. Even those
who feel HVC was misguided or flawed have refined their views of how to properly deal
with the issue as a direct result of their experience with HVC. That experience and
knowledge is incredibly valuable to the success of the 7E7 program, and would not exist
within Boeing if not for HVC.
That said: is this refined knowledge and experience simply a side effect of "failed"
initiatives or was it the intended output all along? Is management achieving their aims or
ignoring their "failures?" Is this thesis going to attempt to answer these two questions?
No.
Whatever the intent, the conclusion regarding initiatives is that they are flawed. There
must be a way to gain valuable knowledge without most of the negative side effects past
initiatives have suffered from. Negative effects include but are not limited to high
budgets, high workload, high dissatisfaction among a significant number of the workers,
and, most importantly, not getting the expected benefits.
7.1.3 What to learn
All initiatives are not bad, and rarely will simply "not declaring" an initiative foster
adoption in any way. It seems, though, that initiatives are best reserved for short-term
projects or ventures where, once they are completed, the initiative is expected to end.
If the goal is high visibility during product development then an initiative with a
corresponding central support structure will provide that. The down side to this strategy
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is that the VRM initiative will, if the past holds true, run its course and fall by the
wayside at the end of the project. This course of action is suggested if the program is
concerned no VRM tasks will be pursued without high visibility.
If the goal of the team is more long-term in nature, educating current management on the
intent and processes of VRM appears to be the way to go. It may delay adoption slightly,
but the concepts will better work their way into the every-day way of doing things.
Direct supervisor pressure and proper workload allocation will serve to blur the line
between "my job" and "VRM," allowing engineers to see VRM tasks and processes as
"the way things are done" rather than something "in addition to" the current work.
A relevant example of non-initiative-based adoption is structural analysis. Not all
companies need to do structural analysis, and very few companies outside aerospace and
civil engineering did significant structural analysis before computer tools advanced to the
point of time and cost effectiveness. The work associated to structural analysis was not
introduced via an initiative. The need for the analysis was clear, people understood the
requirements, and at least at Boeing it quickly became accepted every day practice to
conduct that work for each program. VRM and variation analysis are similar to structural
analysis. Not all companies need to do it, but many, like Boeing, require or desire a level
of performance that can't be achieved without VRM. If the output of VRM is understood
to be equally valuable to that of other analyses, then the tasks and tools should be
introduced to companies much like computers, MS Office, and structural analysis were
introduced - as necessary tools to properly do the job. No name or initiative required.
7.2 Metrics
Metrics used during past VRM projects were discussed during each interview. The two
most common responses about past metrics were that there weren't any, or that they
weren't the right metrics.
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Metrics discussed tended to fall in two categories: those that track progress and those that
measure success. Interviewees that did remember metrics recalled progress metrics but
no success metrics. There was significant support among the interviewees for metrics or
measures to define the goals, objectives, and expectations of VRM, but few examples or
ideas of what those metrics should be.
One military program had 28 customer performance measures associated with the
program and agreed upon by the customer, and all activity was tracked to those measures
throughout the program. Quality and production cycle time were two of the metrics, and
VRM activities were tracked and graded based on them. While these measures cannot be
"proven" until production begins, the team likened them to weight measures. Every
project accurately tracks weight through the development process and has a weight target,
or budget, for success from day one. "Why can't we, with the tools we have, [treat these]
in essentially the same way we treat weight?"
Other tracking metrics proposed or remembered included: percent AIP completion,
number of joints analyzed, number of KCs identified, and percent completion of plans
such as build plans and measurement plans.
Discussion often centered on the difficulty to measure success of VRM. It was pointed
out several times that if VRM is done early enough and properly, there is no way of
knowing what mistakes you would have made without it. This makes it impossible to
know exactly what cost or risk was avoided.
The leading method for attaining this information is to compare the new program to past
programs, but VRM is not the only process or procedure that affects quality, cost, and
producibility. This often makes it difficult to define the amount or percentage of
contribution VRM provides when decisions are influenced by six-sigma, lean, and other
processes or initiatives as well.
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7.2.1 What to learn
Metrics have many functions, but most generally fall into three categories: control,
reporting, and communication. The importance of good metrics that define goals and
objectives rather than tasks or processes will help drive and control employee actions.
Having those metrics in place during a project will report and communicate progress and
aid in the justification of VRM expense.
High priority should be given to the identification and implementation of goal-oriented
metrics, as analysis does show failure to define success, measure progress, and quantify
ROI leads to unmet goals, unmanaged effort, and process abandonment.
This is not to say that metrics are the key to proper management, in fact they seem to be
used too often as a crutch or justification for bad management. Metrics can quickly
explain what is important and provide direction, but they can not take the place of proper
education and active, informed management.
7.3 Accountability
Driving new processes into the team and setting up the right measures and incentives will
fail if accountability is not assigned. Certain people attribute this failure mode to
employees' lack of enthusiasm for activities which will neither help their career nor hurt
it if the tasks are not completed. Others assign blame to poorly defined roles or team
structure, where no one is the ultimate authority and everyone thinks the "other guy is
supposed to do that." The other explanation articulated during the interviews was
training that leaves people knowledgeable enough to be told what to do, but not
knowledgeable enough to figure out what to do, ensuring nothing gets done that isn't
explicitly assigned.
What to learn
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Successful accountability holds the entire team responsible but defines roles and tasks
ultimately assigned to specific team members. High performance teams are able to
juggle work that anyone can do to the member with the lightest load at that moment, and
assign specific specialized tasks to those resident experts capable of completing them.
This requires a manager or management strategy that assigns task accountability to
individuals, but assigns deliverable responsibility to the team as a whole. This strategy,
executed properly, encourages level-loading of team tasks but does not allow confusion
or laziness to break the line of accountability.
7.3.1 Alignment
Management cannot establish metrics and expect people to do more than pay lip service
to them unless performance to the metrics provides a clearly stated benefit. This benefit
does not have to be financial and shouldn't be a scare tactic, but everyone must know
why a metric is in place and what achieving it or falling short of it means to them.
One interviewee recalled a quarterly HVC meeting where people had to update
performance or progress of HVC efforts. "Success was defined by getting through the
pitch rather than succeeding at the process." The failure of the metrics could have been
that the wrong metrics were in place, but a lack of accountability to the existing metrics is
evident.
What to learn
Accountability needs to be assigned up the entire management structure. Holding a team
accountable for a task or process their manager is not held accountable to places an
unhealthy conflict of interest on that manager. Holding a manager accountable for a task
or process his or her manager is not held accountable to does the same, and on up through
the reporting structure.
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Change is best driven from the top down, and the most effective way to enable change is
to align all levels to common goals and hold all levels accountable to common measures.
7.3.2 Team Structure
An appropriate team structure is critical for assigning responsibility. Deciding which
people are responsible for VRM has far reaching implications and consequences. Three
types of team structure have been used in the past. At one extreme is a small core group
of VRM experts that work essentially as consultants to the program and conduct the
majority of the analysis. The other extreme is to teach everyone on the program to do the
VRM tasks. The third structure interviewees had experience with was a mixture, where
VRM experts reside on individual teams throughout the program while still coaching the
entire team on VRM processes and tools.
Core Group
This structure has typically been used for short duration projects where there were
relatively few available VRM experts and a timeline that prohibited extensive training.
Interviewees had mixed opinions about effectiveness.
Experienced people are much more likely to properly execute VRM processes and
interpret VRM analysis. Having an expert team responsible for the detailed analysis
work ensures accountability and maximizes the probability the analysis will be done
correctly.
The problems with this set up are numerous, though. First, it does not scale well. A
small core group can only do so much analysis, and as the size or scope of a project
grows the amount of work the group can do will stay constant, gating the entire process.
Additionally, since they are not familiar with details of the development, it will be
difficult for this group to properly prioritize analysis and mitigation efforts as requests for
work flow in from several separate teams. Finally, those with experience in this team
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structure said the probability of a "who died and put you in charge" attitude throughout
the program was much higher than in-team experts. This feeling was presumed to occur
because team members submitted a design to the experts and then received changes they
need to make back, potentially not understanding why.
Everyone Responsible
By most accounts the structure on the 777 program was to have everyone responsible. It
worked well because each team member understood the stated purpose of VRM (HVC at
the time) and received training in proper execution. This structure scales very well, as
the larger the team gets, the larger the available VRM resource pool gets.
Educating an entire team on VRM, and continuing to educate new members as the team
grows, is difficult. Even a full week of training is no substitute for experience, and a
team with no experience is not going to perform at an expert level. While there will
likely be experts on many of the teams, accountability resides with each member equally
in this setup. Several interviewees on teams like this agreed that unless someone took the
initiative or was assigned to be a VRM focal point, work was shifted around among
equally unskilled team members. If the team was lucky the work got done poorly, if
unlucky, it didn't get done at all.
Blended Team
A blended team strategy was proposed by several interviewees. The strategy here is to
logically place experts as integral members of the multiple program teams to act as
guides and mentors while at the same time educating others as necessary. This strategy
requires metrics to be defined at a team level, with the resident expert responsible for the
coordination of effort and the team responsible for overall output.
This strategy works well because there are clear focal points responsible for making sure
the teams adhere to the proper processes and complete the proper analyses. Because the
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experts are part of the team and are more familiar with the product, this structure leads to
better analysis and interpretation of analysis, and theoretically this setup is less likely to
engender the "who died and put you in charge" reaction. Additionally, having an expert
close by will allow for those less knowledgeable or less confident members of the team to
conduct simpler analyses while having a readily available resource for brief analysis or
process questions. This will presumably increase the quality of work produced by the
team.
This strategy can still fail in a number of ways. Scaling up a project can be very difficult
if the number of teams exceeds the number of experts. It may also fail if the expert is
given no authority to delegate VRM tasks to other team members, who may view all
VRM work as the expert's responsibility. This structure also relies on the VRM expert to
be an effective project manager in addition to being technically proficient. Every team
that has an expert who is not in possession of both attributes will have to develop its own
method for handing the project management aspects of the role. Lastly, communication
between experts must be facilitated in some official or unofficial manner to ensure
continuity of methodologies, communication of new and improved tools or processes,
and minimal splintering of small groups in directions not beneficial for the company.
What to learn
The three options presented are realistic compromises to the unattainable goal of
everyone on the program being an expert. The level of intended VRM investment,
capability and cohesiveness of the people, and current organizational structure must be
taken into account when deciding on a team structure.
In Boeing's case, a blended team was deemed ideal, partly to organize VRM in a similar
way to structural analysis. There is no centrally located structures group, and not
everyone on each design team is expected to perform structural analysis. Each team has
someone who is capable of doing detailed structural analysis, but everyone is responsible
for and capable of identifying when a structural analysis is needed. In addition, every
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engineer and manager appreciates the criticality of structural analysis. This is the state
VRM should strive for, and setting up the team to enable that is a very important step.
7.3.3 Training
Boeing has invested considerable effort and time to train thousands of people in AQS and
HVC over the years, but now finds itself with a lack of VRM expertise. The 7E7 team
must now discover a way to most effectively and efficiently use its existing expertise and
expand that knowledge base.
Looking at past programs' training, former HVC coaches agreed the training they
conducted was good. However, most felt the ideas they tried to get across were either
poorly retained or poorly applied. One trainer recalled determining the success of the
training class by counting the number of discarded training manuals in the conference
room trashcan at the end of class. It tended to fluctuate from large to very large.
Those that felt the training failed to produce results tended not to agree on the reasons
behind the failure. One felt the HVC training amounted to a collection of tools, where
upon completion of training someone would hopefully know how to use the tools, but
without constant supervision would not know when or where to apply those tools.
Another felt training failed to instill the sense of urgency with the need for variation
analysis, and when schedules got tight people cast aside their training and just struggled
to finish drawings. One more HVC and six-sigma trainer felt those leaving training were
able to apply the training to known issues, but were still mostly unable to seek out and
identify new areas or issues where the training could be applied.
Currently, a division in Wichita is trying to build up their VRM expertise. There is no
classroom training. Instead the trainees spend all day each day understanding the
concepts and processes of VRM while simultaneously applying the knowledge to
variation analyses. Some of the analyses are made up exercises, some are actual analyses
needed by various programs. The trainees are co-located with the experts and talk
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frequently, asking questions and seeking help at any time during the day. A current
trainee three weeks into training felt the most important factor in his education was
having the expert a few feet away.
Asked what level of skill was attained after his first week of training, the trainee replied
he could maybe make a simple tolerance model, and maybe analyze the result, but that he
"wouldn't be able to learn DM [VRM] in a week."
If someone three weeks into an intensive one-on-one training schedule feels
uncomfortable with the level of skill achieved after a week, it casts doubt on the level of
skill attainable in a one-week ten-on-one training session.
What to learn
Building VRM capability will require a company to teach its engineers how to identify
areas that are sensitive to variation and to then seek an expert's help on how to analyze
the problem and develop solutions. The company needs to simultaneously reduce the
current expert's workloads and task them with mentoring one to three interested team
members with the analysis tools and processes. Initially these students should do the
majority of the analysis and mitigation creation under close supervision of the expert,
until such time as the workload increases to the point the experts need to conduct analysis
as well. The goal is that by this time these few "trainees" are sufficiently comfortable
with the analyses that they can conduct them on their own with only minimal guidance
and help from the experts.
Training in a classroom setting tends to be expensive and hard to schedule. It becomes
ineffective when these attributes drive a graduate-level course to be condensed into a
one-week or eight-hour training session. All important aspects of VRM cannot be
effectively conveyed in a timeframe most engineers have available for classroom activity,
so traditional training should not be used.
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However, having everyone's eyes trained to seek out problems and identify them has
been a major stumbling block of past initiatives. Without everyone knowledgeable in the
processes used to identify product issues, too many issues and opportunities go
unnoticed. These unnoticed problems will not receive the attention they need, which in
turn causes dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the initiative or practice. The number
of people knowledgeable in the assessment and mitigation processes can and should be
much smaller than the number of people able to identify the issues and call those experts
to the problems.
As stated in the team structure section, placing current experts on each team will provide
a focal point for VRM efforts, but it will also provide a resource for questions about
processes and identification of problems that will help adoption and effectiveness of the
practices.
7.4 What to learn
The initiative cycle shown in Figure 9 had no success path shown. Figure 10 shows two
potential paths incorporating an overview of all the lessons in this section.
It is suggested that initiatives only be used for short term projects or objectives. If the
initiative results are successful and determined useful in the future, an effort should be
made to remove the initiative and institutionalize the workload via a new position or job
description.
If the objective is longer term in nature, it is suggested an initiative not be set up, and
instead work packages and responsibilities be created to legitimize the work, underscore
the permanence of the work, and associate a "this is my job and this is how it is done"
attitude to the work.
With all the paths proper training or education, metrics, and alignment are critical
ingredients for success.
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Chapter 8: Lessons in Processes
Processes rather than tools are what make VRM beneficial. Tools such as 3DCS can give
unquestionable benefit, but the understanding of and adherence to logical VRM processes
will better target those tools for maximum effect. Books from Whitney (2004) and
Thornton (2003) define excellent VRM processes, and six-sigma books such as Yang
(2003) define additional analysis processes useful in VRM activities, but the processes to
maximize the effect those VRM processes have on the product have received little focus.
The absence of well defined processes connecting data collection, VRM, and engineering
will serve to sub-optimize these small pieces rather than optimize the whole product.
Focus needs to be placed on the forest rather than the trees, and the three biggest returns
on investment will be to improve the data collection process, the communication process,
and the integration process.
8.1 Data Collection Process
The processes used to collect data are, like the processes for gathering requirements and
objectives, the basis upon which all other activities are built. Important aspects to
consider are cost accounting and ownership, and data integrity.
8.1.1 Cost accounting and ownership
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3, internal and external suppliers are often asked to take
measurements in the factory without an understanding of how these actions will affect the
product, or why the measurements are being taken. Furthermore, it is rare that the
additional time and cost of taking the measurements are removed from the cost
accounting system, which will directly affect the metrics most factories are judged by:
cost or cost-per-unit.
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In order to avoid situations like Boeing faced in 1997 the measurements must provide
immediate information to the factory for its own benefit in addition to the long term
capability information. By giving production defined value for their actions at least one
barrier to factory acceptance, the cost accounting barrier, can be dealt with head on.
Providing convincing financial incentives to the factory for a measurement plan can also
give manufacturing a reason to feel ownership for the process. One of the many issues
with Boeing's measurement plan was that manufacturing was handed a measurement
plan and ordered to fulfill its requirements. There was no sense of ownership within the
factory for the quality of the results, any follow-on analysis or communication, or any
improvements to the measurements or measurement processes. If production feels they
are getting a return on their measurement investment, they will take actions to maximize
that return. That willingness to act for the betterment of the process is the "sense of
ownership" required to ensure measurements will be taken, taken well, and used to the
benefit of the product.
8.1.2 Data Integrity
Data integrity is defined as ensuring the data reflects the actual value involved, contains
sufficient detail, is posted in a timely manner, stored securely, readily retrievable, and is
safeguarded against improper alteration, disclosure, or use (U.C. Berkeley 2004).
These seemingly basic and obvious rules are fundamentals that are often overlooked. If
the data at the beginning of the development process does not conform to these aspects in
any way, no amount of data integrity later will undo the "garbage in - garbage out"
realities of information management.
Two of the most overlooked parts of this definition are sufficient detail, and readily
retrievable. All types of data management systems must walk a fine line between too
little information to be useful and too much for an engineer to effectively or efficiently
find the pertinent information. When there are several production facilities or suppliers
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there is often a proliferation of data locations or even software used to search the data. If
engineers looking for process capability data must first determine which system to look
in, then determine how to use the particular facility's search capabilities, only then to
discover if the needed data exists, then it will not be long until engineering limits their
willingness to search for the data.
At this point not only is the rest of the development process sub-optimized and
potentially corrupt, but production may begin to feel the data they collect for engineering
is unused and no longer worth taking. This problem and its results have been previously
discussed.
8.2 Communication Process
In multi-department companies effective communication is crucial for timely and
accurate transfer of data and ideas. Management has a responsibility and the ability to
maximize the effectiveness of communication within the product development process.
First and foremost is to define the proper communication mediums and procedure. This
can be as simple as ensuring people are educated in how to access the system of record
for various information. This is especially important as new data systems are brought on-
line that might not otherwise be brought to the attention of all the groups in the company.
Part of defining the proper communication mediums is simplicity. In large companies
and companies that work with multiple suppliers, there are often different standards of
communication between different locations or between internal groups and external
companies. Having one standard of communication that is used both internally and
externally will simplify the communication process, quicken the learning curve thereby
increasing information accuracy and understandability, and generally make the daily
tasks of engineering easier to manage.
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Beyond electronic communication, personal communication effectiveness can have a
large impact on the quality or quantity of information transfer. Experts in various fields
often present data or information in a format that is only readily understandable by
another expert, and not by the actual audience for the information. An often used
example is the chart of O-ring temperatures that contained the proper information but
failed to prevent NASA from launching the Challenger space shuttle in 1986 (Tufte
1997). Basic training in presentation effectiveness and communication principles might
not have prevented this tragedy, and might not prevent other failures in information
transfer, but the risk of not training people to communicate far outweigh the costs of
training.
8.3 Integration Process
If there is a risk the data management and communication processes in between the data
collection, VRM, and engineering processes can get overlooked, then businesses should
look at ways to mitigate this risk. Three important integration efforts are physical
integration, team integration, and supplier integration.
8.3.1 Physical Integration
Distance matters, and all efforts to co-locate the separate teams should be taken. Co-
location carries two important benefits in the informal "water cooler" interactions that
can occur and in individuals' willingness to trust and cooperate with team members.
"Water cooler" interactions are those informal meetings of co-workers, frequently around
the water cooler or the coffee pot, where the happenstance meeting induces a
conversation where important information is exchanged. Examples of "water cooler"
interactions that lead to breakthroughs include an interaction between two teams at 3M -
one responsible for sandpaper and one for adhesives - that lead to the invention of
masking tape (Eisenhart 2000).
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Bradner and Mark (2002) also investigated the effect of distance on trust and cooperation
within teams. Despite the seemingly insignificant difference between a team spread
across a state and one across the world, they found that distance or perceived distance had
a significant impact on individuals' tendency to trust information from, cooperate with, or
attempt to deceive those at a distance. This type of behavior can help explain the
ineffectiveness of VRM efforts that are conducted in different locations - even floors
within the same building - than the engineering activities.
While research is being done into the creation of "virtual water coolers" and methods for
decreasing the negative effects of distance on office interaction, it is clear the easiest
solution is to decrease distance and increase the interaction of the various teams
responsible for the overall design of the product. It is also clear that infinite improvement
in VRM-specific processes or information quality will have no effect on overcoming
these important realities of human interaction.
8.3.2 Team Integration
An important trend in product development is "concurrent engineering," or "integrated
product process development." These are management techniques that simultaneously
integrate all essential product development activities through the use of multi-disciplinary
teams to optimize design, manufacturing and supportability processes. By integrating
production specialists, VRM specialists, and engineering specialists, several of the
communication barriers can be broken down and information can flow more freely.
Fine (1998) extends this idea beyond the engineering processes into supply chain and
business processes, proposing the tighter all business functions are bound together the
faster the responsiveness of the company and the better equipped a company will be to
optimize the whole rather than sub-optimize each piece of the product lifecycle. This
principle holds true for VRM processes and people.
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By integrating VRM into production and engineering teams, whether it be though a
blended team structure discussed in Chapter 7 or through other mechanisms and
structures, VRM will have to rely less on formal communication processes and be
positioned to more effectively respond to the needs of the product.
8.3.3 Supplier Integration
When co-developing a product with a supplier, companies can rarely define or control the
processes suppliers use to develop or manufacture their components. They therefore
must manage suppliers by fully and accurately defining requirements and objectives in
advance of both development and then production. Including supplier representatives on
an integrated product development team is a great integration step, but suppliers must be
managed based on performance to exact requirements contained in contractual
agreements.
Boeing has in the past attempted different methods for supplier process management,
varying from no interaction to forcing processes upon the suppliers. Opinions vary on
the success of Boeing intervention, but more than not the thought is that involvement
costs a great deal of money and provides little if any benefit. The most critical view is
that Boeing hired experts to do a job better or cheaper than Boeing could, but then tries to
make the supplier follow the processes Boeing would if it were done internally, driving
cost up or quality down.
Even if one believes helping suppliers with VRM is worthwhile, the staffing reality for
most companies is that they do not have spare VRM experts. Existing experts need to
concentrate their knowledge on internal issues rather than external details.
With no one to manage or aid suppliers and partners in VRM techniques, it would be
dangerous to force VRM on them and trust it will be done properly. Instead, vital
resources need to concentrate on providing suppliers and partners with clear and accurate
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requirements, KCs, tolerances, and Cpks for suppliers to work to. This is the only viable
option to "manage" supplier efforts.
8.4 What to learn
The absence of well defined processes connecting data collection, VRM, and engineering
will serve to sub-optimize these small pieces rather than optimize the whole product. By
integrating the various development processes as tightly as possible, companies will
realize more value from the overall development process.
Physical proximity as well as full development team membership will not only increase
the communication of ideas and information, but will allow VRM to more quickly
respond to emerging issues engineering faces, increasing VRM's value to the product and
the company.
Lastly, because VRM affects the design of a product that is not currently in production, it
often times has a very long payback period. By integrating it into the development
process its value is going to be more apparent and definable before production begins,
and is less likely to get phased out due to lack of results.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is not to summarize the information contained in this thesis, but
to synthesize the various case studies, lessons, and ideas to present a final look at VRM
from a development process perspective. The hypothesis will be discussed to determine
if there was enough to data to support it, and some final thoughts on how to best improve
an organization's VRM program will be considered.
The hypothesis of this paper is that processes and tools enable VRM success, but
information, organization, and management structure are the main factors determining the
degree of success a VRM program will experience.
9.1 Synthesis
The first step in addressing the hypothesis is to look at the cargo floor case study, the
lessons discussed in Chapters 5 through 8, and the second case study, dealing with the
final aft body join of the 7E7, to determine how well they relate.
9.1.1 "Case Study" - 7E7 Aft Final Body Join
This section will quickly describe this case study. The details are intentionally left vague
both for proprietary reasons and because the project's engineering purpose is not at issue.
It is the effectiveness of VRM in the engineering development that is. However, for
some frame of reference, it was determined a small description of the project was needed.
Every Boeing commercial aircraft since the 707 has a long cigar-shaped fuselage with a
more or less conical nose, a body section through the majority of its length that remains
constant in diameter (i.e. constant body section), and a taper at the tail. All current
widebody aircraft are built in sections that resemble very large toilet paper rolls that are
joined together to make the airplane one piece. Currently, these section joins are always
89
located in the constant body section, and never in the tapered tail section nor in the
conical nose section.
When determining where to split the 7E7 into sections - and therefore where to have the
section joins - it was decided to investigate putting the aft section join in the tapered area
rather than at a constant body section area, for several engineering reasons. The Final
Assembly and Delivery team was asked to determine if this type of join was
manufacturable given certain cost and quality targets. A major component in
determining an answer was to figure out if the new design would have an unfamiliar
tolerance stack-up, or uncontrollable variation stack-up, and if so what this meant. In
order to do this, FAD asked for a VRM analysis of the join, which was conducted over a
roughly one month period.
The VRM methods followed the same "identification, assessment, mitigation" steps as
the first case study. While the details of the steps are proprietary, they are mostly
irrelevant. The only thing this paper is concerned with is the fact that the study found the
tapered body join to induce significantly more variation than the constant body section
join, and the effectiveness of the processes to get this information into the design of the
product, which will be a major part of the discussion in the following subsection.
9.1.2 Case Study Support of the Lessons
This section is going to walk through the lessons in information management,
management and organizational support, and process in the order they appeared in this
text. Rather than summarizing each section, it will attempt to draw out more detail from
the case studies to provide "real world" examples in order to support, or make more
resonant, the lessons.
Both case studies began with an investigation of the requirements. As a contractor to
Boeing, direct access to the requirements database was not available. This made this task
incredibly difficult. In itself this may seem a slight inconvenience, but in an era where
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significant portions of design work are conducted by partners or contractors, lack of basic
access to requirements by all those outside the corporate entity can be disastrous to the
end product.
Identifying key characteristics was an interesting challenge for both case studies as well.
While KCs are often clearly marked on part drawings, there are few if any assembly
drawings that show assembly or system level KCs. While not a show-stopping problem,
it clearly means that each new analysis must "reinvent the wheel" to determine what the
assembly KCs are. It is good to reinvestigate the KCs from time-to-time, but the most
common problem faced in the body-join analysis was my investigation of assembly KCs
generated some that hadn't been identified before. Unfortunately this invalidated the
analysis in some peoples' eyes, who simply responded that the analysis wasn't even
looking at the right KCs, and therefore couldn't have been done properly. This reaction,
while potentially understandable on an analysis of an existing product, was baffling on a
new product that employed designs, materials, and concepts never before seen at the
company. Nevertheless, it was an unforeseen challenge that reduced the effectiveness of
VRM.
Process capability was an especially contentious subject. Entering into any conversation
with engineering about process capability was an exercise in circular logic. The body
join case study provides an excellent example. No process capability was available, since
the process to join non-constant body section pieces existed. Engineering would not
provide tolerances for the analysis in the stead of capability data, and would request the
analysis be done using existing capability, even though it might not be precise. At the
conclusion of the analysis, it was often stated that the results were worse than reality,
because engineering would simply tighten the tolerance to bring the variation back under
control.
The spiral would continue when engineering was again asked for tolerance values they
intended to specify, based on the analysis. This was to determine both the implications of
the tolerance in the analysis and to determine if that capability could be achieved.
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Multiple times a value was finally given, only to have operations and manufacturing
determine that tolerance was impossible to attain, at which point engineering individuals
would reply that manufacturing just didn't want to do anything hard, and dismiss their
concerns.
Clearly, the lack of credible data at the beginning of the process hindered the
effectiveness of the results. The fact that the analysis was not performed under the
watching eye of engineering, but instead only shown at completion - so as not to distract
from the "real" engineering work - also served to inject doubt into the process. After all,
who from engineering can say the analysis was done properly and the results should be
heeded if no one from engineering knows how the analysis was done?
To top all this off, no metric existed to judge the effectiveness of VRM activity or the
amount of VRM output engineering incorporated into the design. The only
accountability development teams had to VRM was their own sense of right and wrong
and what is best for the product. This rarely works in the favor of VRM when it is the
development teams' designs VRM seeks to change. Most of the arguments used in the
body join case study involved financial, quality, and time aspects, but in the end it was
usually a personal appeal to the engineer's sense of duty to the product that affected
behavior, not raw numbers or data. While noble, this is a process that clearly relies on a
safety net of conscience rather than effective practices, and if too many items hit the
safety net some are going to start falling through.
The last example this section will discuss is one of effective communication. Explicitly
this thesis spoke of communicating data and ideas, but there is much more to
communication that this. The entire premise of the body join analysis was a design
decision to put the aft join in a tapered section of the fuselage. Over one man-month of
work went into the analysis, and when it came time to present, instead of presenting the
findings the VRM team was told the design decision had been reversed less than a week
after it had been made. No one was told of the reversal because the group that wanted to
make the change made a miscalculation in their case to have a tapered section join, and to
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avoid embarrassing them, the design was changed back to a constant body section join
with no announcement. Apparently no thought went into the loss of time and work
associated with not informing VRM, and who knows how many other groups, about the
design change. While one man-month may seem insignificant on a project of the scale of
the 7E7, this wasn't the only project this type of thing can happen to, and it wasn't the
only time. Cost and quality will in one way or another suffer because of a lack of formal
communication protocol in situations like this.
9.2 Was the Problem "Solved"
As stated in Chapter 3.4, firm data on the effect of VRM, and more specifically the case
studies and whitepaper, on the 7E7 are unattainable at this time. Because of this,
subjective measures were developed to determine the success of the projects. Those
measures were:
" Are ASIT members convinced that focusing attention and/or improvement
activities on identified processes will contribute to improved VRM performance
versus previous VRM efforts
* Is awareness throughout the management structure heightened with respect to
VRM issues, and is management convinced identified processes and improvement
efforts are valid and will contribute to improved product performance versus
previous product development efforts
" Are the conclusions valid across other types of analysis, work efforts, or business
needs
" Were the topics, improvement suggestions, and conclusions in accordance with
experience and results from one or both of the case studies
In one-on-one and group meetings with the ASIT team it became clear that the
whitepaper work was well received. During writing and after release of the whitepaper
the interview notes, drafts, and final copy were used and referenced often. Once released
and disseminated throughout the engineering management structure, several email
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responses showed up discussing favorable opinions of the paper, both its content and
style. Two responses in particular stated that the words VRM could be removed and any
other initiative put in its place, and the paper would still be relevant and correct. Finally,
Chapter 9.1.2 was written to detail the strong correlation between both case studies and
the material contained in this thesis.
While there is room for interpretation and argument, it seems that the work contained in
this thesis supported the hypothesis, and at least pointed a clear path to "solving" long-
term problems with Boeing's VRM program.
9.3 See the Forest, Focus on the Trees
A key tenet of VRM is that it is critical to determine where the weakest or most
vulnerable link in the product is and focus attention and energy there. This same
philosophy should be used to determine the weakest link in the development chain and
focus attention there until it is strong. At this point the new tools, processes, or work
roles should be institutionalized and improvement efforts refocused on whatever the new
weakest link is.
Short of this holistic development process view, each link will be sub-optimized, their
benefits compartmentalized, and the product weakened from either a cost, quality, or
functionality standpoint. By looking at the whole forest, the weakest trees can be tended
to and given the attention they need, thereby improving the health of the whole forest.
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions
A. What was the design team structure?
o (IPT?, who involved, who left out? Suppliers?)
o What were the member titles and responsibilities?
B. How did requirements enter the project - as raw customer requirements or as
technical requirements already scrubbed from customer requirements?
o Would you have like requirements in some other form, and if so what form
and why?
C. What other methods or inputs were used (to determine KCs)?
o (reqt's docs, FMEA, warranty data, past customer complaints, quality reports,
supplier info/team members, process experts/reports)
D. What phases and gates (or other process definition) did the design process follow
once requirements were received?
o How were decisions made, in what order, ... ?
E. (Assuming I'm talking to people who used DM in some form) What were your
reasons / goals for using DM?
o (looking for something around best design at lower cost using right tolerance,
ensuring minimal defects. Anything else may indicate they don't understand
the point of DM)
o (Hopefully get how it applies both to the product and the design process)
F. What were the specific DM tasks and how did they fit into the above (phase and gate
question) process?
o (every day attention, once a week/month conversation)
o (In each meeting, on team member's own time, report outs or no)
o (part of the process or it's own side process)
o [In conjunction with above questions can compare intent to execution]
G. What tools were available to execute the above tasks, and who had access to them?
H. Who executed and who was ultimately responsible for DM?
o Were there VRM "experts" on the team, or was VRM everyone's
responsibility?
If experts, how much authority did they have, and was it enough/too
much?
I. What metrics were used to define / track DM effort?
J. Were the engineers compensated/rated based on the above metrics?
o If so, in you opinion was the compensation enough to drive the proper
behavior?
o If not, what metrics were they compensated on?
K. Now that I have a view of the engineers work and incentive, how well did the
incoming requirements and other inputs mentioned above allow engineers to do and
complete work, especially around DM efforts?
o What other inputs would have helped the team and how?
L. How was the DM effort scoped?
o (What was the initial CR level of abstraction used?)
o (How were systems and subsystems grouped/defined to aid in the process?)
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o (How were requirements to keep in the DM effort extracted or cast aside?)
o (How were the KCs accepted / rejected / ignored? - process for decisions)
o To what level of detail do you model? (looking for some type of answer that
will lead me to believe they are "way too much" "way too little" or right at
80-20) (model documentation would be awesome)
o If the cost of addressing a System KC is/was unknown, how did the team
decide which ones to address? (non-value quantification, gut feel,
investigation, what process?)
o How was variation predicted
" Was EXPECTED or BEST CASE variation used?
o How were flowdowns validated
o In addressing costs, did the team use qualitative, step, or continuous cost
functions? Why?
o How accurate did the models turn out to be?
o (How far down into "rat-holes" did the group go? How long did it take the
group to realize they were in a rat hole? What was the process for getting out?
How do you think the team would rank on keeping focus / scope in mind?
Why, and how could it have been better?)
o Did /How often did poorly defined KCs introduce extensive discussion or
anger? How much "rework" time usually resulted from such
"misunderstandings?"
o If a chosen mitigation strategy became a schedule bottleneck, which came first
- schedule or mitigation? Why? Any exceptions?
- What happened as a result when production started?
- How do you think this effected the customer experience/satisfaction?
M. When designing, how much focus was put on using in-process tuning, ensuring
optimal assembly process, proper indexing and datuming, proper tolerances?
N. Determinite assembly or fixtured assembly? Why and what was the decision
process?
0. How much thought or effort went into error proofing designs for assembly? Can you
give an example?
P. How were KCs communicated to suppliers? Did the suppliers understand which KCs
to produce to and which were just "comments?" If not, what were the approximate
costs in terms of money and time lost?
o How is VRM applied at / forced on suppliers? What do you feel are the cost /
benefit tradeoffs of moving from this method (or are you at the best method)?
Q. After production, were field incidents reported back to the team? If so how, and what
process was used to deal with the information, if not, why not?
o If field incidents were reported back, do you have any data on the
effectiveness of VRM efforts to reduce the number of incidents? If no data,
gut feel?
R. How were the VRM process, results, and lessons learned documented and shared?
S. Which comes first - performance, quality, cost?
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